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In this Reply Brief, the parties will be referred to by the
same names as in Appellants' initial Brief.
This Brief articulates three (3) issues.
I.

They are:

THE TRIAL COURT APPLIED AN IMPROPER STANDARD AND FAILED TO

ADDRESS THE PROPER STANDARD IN DETERMINING GRANDPARENT VISITATION.
II.

THE TRIAL COURT'S LIMITATION ON VISITATION WAS UNDULY

RESTRICTIVE AND IS NOT BASED ON ANY FINDING THAT THE LIMITED
VISITATION WOULD BE IN THE BEST INTEREST OF THE GRANDCHILDREN.
III.

THIS APPEAL IS NOT FRIVOLOUS OR WITHOUT MERIT AND IF

THIS COURT AFFIRMS

THE TRIAL COURT'S

DECISION, NO AWARD

OF

ATTORNEY'S FEES ON APPEAL SHOULD BE GRANTED TO THE APPELLEE.

ARGUMENT
I.

THE TRIAL COURT APPLIED AN IMPROPER STANDARD AND FAILED TO

ADDRESS THE PROPER STANDARD IN DETERMINING GRANDPARENT VISITATION.
In this action, the Court concluded sua sponte that since the
statute granting grandparent visitation (§ 30-5-2(1) Utah Code
Annotated,

1953

as

amended) was

unconstitutional,

the

only

visitation Boyd and Beverly were entitled to was that to which
Janet stipulated.

Janet argues that since the Court granted the

visitation Janet stipulated to, the issue of the grandchildren's
best interest was, by such stipulation, removed from the case. The
argument is fallacious for two reasons:
a.

When the Court held the grandparent visitation statute was

unconstitutional, it necessarily followed that the Court applied
the wrong standard to determination of whether there should be
1

grandparent visitation. The Court concluded that Boyd and Beverly
had no right to visit the grandchildren because the grandparent
visitation statute was unconstitutional.

The Court then was left

to conclude, as it did, that only if Janet voluntarily allowed
visitation would the Court grant visitation, and then only to the
extent Janet stipulated to such visitation.

It is apparent from

this line of reasoning that had Janet refused to grant any
visitation, the Court would have not ordered any visitation.
It is clear from the decided cases that the courts must be
guided by the humanitarian purpose of the statute and by the
independent evaluation of the best interest of the grandchildren
and not by what the mother of the grandchildren is willing to
allow.

(90 ALR 3d 222).

In fact, in Goolsbee v. Heft (1977 Texas Civ. App.) 549 SW 2d
34, the Texas Court expressly determined that the trial judge's
power to grant visitation was not subject to the will of the
parent, because otherwise the statute giving grandparent visitation
in the best interest of the grandchildren would have been without
effect.
b.

When the Court found the grandparent visitation statute

unconstitutional,

the

issue

of

the

best

interest

of

the

grandchildren was not then developed, articulated and applied by
the Court in this case.
requires a three-pronged

The best interest of the grandchildren
inquiry by the Trial Court.

inquiries are:
1.

The wishes of the grandchildren;
2

Those

2.

The

interaction

and

interrelationship

of

the

grandchildren with their parents, siblings, and any other
persons who may significantly affect the grandchildren's
best interest; and
3.

The mental
involved.

In

this

and

physical

health of

all

individuals

(90 ALR 3rd, p. 229)

case,

considerations at all.

the

Court

never

addressed

these

three

In its Findings of Fact, the Court founds

1. Some visitation of the children by the
Plaintiffs will be beneficial and in the best interests
and well-being of the children. (R. p. 79-82)
This is a bald statement that offers no basis

for the

statement, how the statement was arrived at, why visitation would
benefit the grandchildren, how visitation would benefit and be in
the best interest of the grandchildren, or the extent to which
visitation should be granted. The finding does not articulate any
of the above three tests for determining the best interest of the
grandchildren.

This failure on the part of the Trial Judge is

reversible error.

II.

THE TRIAL COURT'S LIMITATION ON VISITATION WAS UNDULY

RESTRICTIVE AND IS NOT BASED ON ANY FINDING THAT THE LIMITED
VISITATION WOULD BE IN THE BEST INTEREST OF THE GRANDCHILDREN.
Janet argues that the visitation granted by the Court is that
requested by Boyd and Beverly and that Boyd and Beverly cannot,
therefore, complain about the visitation.
Brief.)

(See page 18 of Janet's

This argument is lacking in candor.
3

This argument takes

one part of Boyd and Beverly's request in isolation from their
other requests.

For example, the argument ignores Request No. 1,

which is requests:
1. One (1) twenty-seven (27) hour period every
other week, preferably from 6:00 p.m. Friday night to
9:00 p.m. on Saturday night.
If the children have
church, school or recreational activities or music
lessons during this time, Campbells will see that the
children involved attend all such activities.
Boyd and Beverly's requests for visitation must be taken in
their totality.

The order of the Court is so restrictive as to

make it virtually impossible for Boyd and Beverly to be with all of
the grandchildren at the same time or even separately, frequently
enough and for a long enough time on each visitation to enable Boyd
and Beverly to establish a meaningful relationship with the
grandchildren and help the grandchildren to understand

their

father's family and its values.
The U.S. Supreme Court has recognized the importance of the
extended

family

relationships.

and

particularly

of

grandparent/grandchild

In Grizwold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 85 S.Ct.

1678, 14 L.Ed.2d 510 (1965), the Court talks of "respect for the
teachings of history [and] solid recognition of the basic values
that underlie our society."

In Moore v. City of East Cleveland,

Ohio, 431 U.S. 494, 97 S.Ct. 1932, 52 L.Ed.2d 531 (1977), (case
which held unconstitutional a city zoning ordinance prohibiting a
grandmother from allowing two grandsons to stay in her apartment)
the Court further elaborates that these societal values include
"the

tradition

of

uncles,

aunts,

cousins

and

especially

grandparents ..." and explains that the Constitution "protects the
4

sanctity of the family precisely because the institution of the
family is deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition."
III.

THIS APPEAL IS NOT FRIVOLOUS OR WITHOUT MERIT AND IF

THIS COURT AFFIRMS

THE TRIAL COURT'S

DECISION, NO AWARD

OF

ATTORNEY'S FEES ON APPEAL SHOULD BE GRANTED TO THE APPELLEE.
The applicable statute governing an award of attorney's fees
is § 78-27-56, Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as amended.
statute, an award of attorney's

Under that

fees can be made against a

prevailing party "... if the Court determines that the action or
defense to the action was without merit and not brought or asserted
in good faith ..."
This appeal directly challenges the Trial Judge's incorrect
application of the standard of review appropriate in determining
grandparent visitation.

In allowing his personal views of U.C.A.

§30-5-2 to influence his decision, Judge Low committed reversible
error which

is valid

justification

for appeal

"warranted by

existing law" and made "based on a good faith argument".

Utah

Rules of Appellate Procedure, Rule 33. Judge Low had discretion in
deciding whether visitation should be awarded, but he was also
bound by the requirement that he "minister to the needs of the
children according to an enlightened and objective evaluation of
the circumstances." Ehrlich v. Ressner, (1977) 55 App. Div 2d 953,
391 NYS 2d 152.
grandparent

Also, that he follow the statute and determine

visitation

based

on

grandchildren.

5

the

best

interest

of

the

In the case at barf Judge Low allowed his personal view on the
constitutionality of U.C.A. §30-5-2 to color his focus away from
what is actually in the best interest of the Campbell children. By
applying the incorrect standard of review, the Trial Judge set a
visitation schedule on a basis other than the basis required by
§ 30-5-2(1) Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as amended, and which does
not constitute an arrangement of visitation which is in the best
interest of the children involved.
This appeal is motivated solely by Boyd and Beverly's desire
to

insure

a result

grandchildren.

that

is

in the best

interest

of their

They contend it is in the best interest of the

grandchildren to know and learn from their grandparents since their
father is not available to influence the grandchildren and teach
them his families' values.

Janet argues that Boyd and Beverly's

dissatisfaction over the visitation awarded was based on a desire
to be allowed free reign of the children without consulting or
involving

Janet.

allegation.

Boyd

and

Beverly

specifically

deny

this

Their concern is exclusively for their grandchildren

and the desire to continue a meaningful, close family relationship
with them.

Because they feel the visitation awarded will not

result in such relationship and is not conducive to the goal of
achieving the best interest of the children set forth in the
statute, they appeal the decision of the lower Court. This appeal
is warranted, with merit, and motivated solely for the purpose of
accomplishing what is in the best interest of their grandchildren.
This objective was not achieved in the lower Court, therefore the

6

lower Court decision should be reversed and no attorney's fees
should be awarded.
Appellants submit there is no basis in fact or law for a
finding by the Court that their appeal is without merit and not
brought

or asserted

in good

faith.

Appellee's

request for

attorney's fees is without merit and should be denied by this
Court.

CONCLUSION
In the instant case, the Trial Court applied an improper
standard for determining grandparent visitation and failed to
address the correct standard. The Trial Judge allowed his personal
views of the applicable statute to taint his decision and as a
result, failed to address the objective set forth in the statute,
that of achieving an arrangement which is in the best interest of
the children involved.

The error constitutes reversible error.

The statute is concerned exclusively with the children's
welfare.

Judge Low, believing the statute to unconstitutionally

impinge on the mother's

rights, granted only the extent of

visitation stipulated to by the mother, Janet. This action almost
wholly disregarded any analysis of what would actually be in the
best interest of the children.

This error constitutes a basic

disregard for the purpose of the grandparent visitation statute,
that of benefitting the children involved.
This appeal is made on the good faith belief that reversible
error was committed

in the lower Court when it applied the
7

incorrect standard of review as set forth in U.C.A. §30-5-2(1).
Because the appeal has merit and was not brought or asserted in bad
faithf and because clear and substantial error was made, Boyd and
Beverly respectfully request this Court deny Appellee's request for
attorney's fees and remand this Case to the Trial Court for a new
trial before a different Judge who can hear and determine the
statutory and factual issue without bias and with the best interest
of the Campbell grandchildren in mind.
DATED this 23rd day of June, 1994.
Respectfully submittedf
OLSON & HOGGAN, P.C.

L. Brent Hoggan
Attorneys for AppeMarfts
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